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 In this paper the author deals with the concept of social trust. 
Since the concept has so far been neglected in the political science re-
search in Croatia, the author intends to map it out for the scientific 
and expert political science public and lay the foundations for its fu-
ture use. By means of the secondary data analysis, the author de-
scribes the state of social trust in Croatia. First he contextualizes the 
concept of social trust from the perspective of the dominant ap-
proaches in political science research; then he identifies the distin-
guishing features of social trust in relation to the other types of the 
trust; and finally, he provides an overview of major works on the im-
portance and functions of social trust. The last portion of the paper is 
devoted to the analysis of the levels of social trust which shows that 
Croatia is a society with low levels of social trust which, according to 
the author, may represent an obstacle for political and economic de-
velopment. 
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Introduction 
 The concept of social trust has been extensively used in the last ten years 
in political science research, especially when attempting to explain the effi-
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ciency of the functioning of democratic political systems. Numerous studies 
show that social trust positively affects the quality of democracy in well-es-
tablished democratic states, as well as in postcommunist democracies. De-
spite such propulsion, the concept of social trust so far has not been consis-
tently used in political science analyses of the functioning of democracy in 
Croatia. On the contrary, it might be said that this concept has not been 
studied in Croatian political science at the level of systematic and coherent 
description and explication.  
 Thus, this paper has two goals. To use a scientific concept one has to be 
cognizant of it so the first goal is to make the political science public famil-
iar with the concept of social trust. The second goal is to outline, by means 
of the secondary data analysis, the state of social trust in Croatia, using the 
temporal and spatial comparison i.e. the data for Croatia are compared for 
three points of reference and also with the situation in other countries. Such 
goals make this paper a sort of an exploratory research that may serve as the 
first step in mapping out the possible uses of the concept of social trust in the 
future research of social and political phenomena in Croatia.  
 The paper is divided into five parts. The first part contextualizes social 
trust in relation to the dominant research approaches in political science. In 
the second part different types of trust are described with a special focus on 
the characteristics of social trust that distinguish it from the other types. The 
third part explains the importance of social trust for contemporary societies, 
while the fourth part offers an overview of the major studies of the functions 
of social trust. The fifth part is devoted to the state of social trust in Croatia.  
 
Political culture, social capital and social trust 
 The development of political science after World War Two meant a 
pluralization of the approaches and methods used in the research of political 
phenomena. Nevertheless, the main developments may be identified. Thus 
Robert Putnam (1993), the eminent American political scientists at the end 
of the 20th century, claims that in the contemporary political science three 
approaches to the analysis of political phenomena prevail. They are distin-
guished by which of the three concepts they use as a prism through which 
they view the sphere of politics and the functioning of political systems. 
These three concepts are: institutions, interest and culture. Vladimir Vujčić 
in the introduction to his book Politička kultura demokracije /Political cul-
ture of democracy/ similarly writes: “In political science today there are 
three major approaches to the study of politics: the institutional approach, 
the rational-choice or public-policy approach and the cultural approach” 
(2001: 11). The advocates of the institutional approach see in political insti-
tutions the key factor for understanding politics, while the champions of the 
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rational-choice theory claim that human beings are above all rational and 
interest-oriented beings and that this should be borne in mind when analyz-
ing political processes. About the third approach he says: “Political-cultural 
approach to politics claims that each politics has its subjective, and not only 
objective base, and the political behaviour and the activities of the masses 
and the elites are not only rationally and interest-based, but are also 
grounded in traditions, customs, value orientations, emotions, trust and loy-
alty, and so on.” (11)  
 For this paper the third approach is of particular interest. The basic as-
sumption of this approach is that the cultural system of a community either 
hinders development and stability, or it can be the driving force of social 
progress and welfare. It must be noted that this idea has a long history in the 
history of political thought. Greek philosophers argued that the functioning 
of a political community does not depend solely on this or that alignment of 
political institutions, but that there is another sphere in which citizens’ ac-
tivism is exhibited, fundamental political values and sentiments expressed 
and which is also important for the development of that political community.  
 This idea of the significance of cultural factors i.e. the subjective dimen-
sion of politics, was for the first time consistently – and using the concept of 
political culture – outlined in contemporary political science by the Ameri-
can political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their book The 
Civic Culture (1963 [2000]). On the basis of a comparative research of po-
litical life in five states they concluded that the functioning of democratic 
political institutions largely depends on the knowledge and values of their 
citizens as well as their attitudes to political process. Their message is 
momentously expressed in the following quote: “The statesmen who attempt 
to create political democracy often concentrate upon the formation of a po-
litical party to stimulate the participation of the masses. But the development 
of a stable and effective government depends upon the orientation that peo-
ple have to the political process – upon the political culture. Unless the po-
litical culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the suc-
cess of that system are slim” (2000: 365). 
 The concept of political culture quickly became extremely popular and 
was often used in comparative research so that soon the political-cultural ap-
proach emerged in political science. In his analysis Peter Mair highlights the 
1960s and the first half of the 1970s as the time when comparative politics 
was dominated by the politico-cultural approach and was “the golden age” 
of comparative politics (Mair, 1996: 309-335). One of the problems for the 
comparative research using that concept is the fact that political culture is an 
extremely complex, multidimensional concept. Namely, Almond and Verba 
thought that the concept of political culture is abstract enough to satisfy one 
of the basic requirements that should be met by the concepts used in the re-
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search of a number of different countries: such concepts should be able to 
“travel” i.e. to be applicable in various social and political contexts, without 
their “stretching” i.e. the distortion of their original sense and meaning.1  
 In order for a concept to “travel” far – to be applied in an analysis of 
political phenomena in a number of countries – it must be highly abstract, in 
other words consist of only a few distinguishing features. However, concrete 
research soon showed that political culture is a highly complex concept 
containing a set of defining features i.e. dimensions such as political partici-
pation, civic competence, political knowledge, national pride, party affilia-
tion, trust, and so on.2 This very complexity posed a problem in the use of 
this concept in the research which wants to encompass countries with differ-
ent socio-political contexts.  
 As a solution to this problem, in political research there are some other 
concepts by means of which the influence of the subjective dimension of 
politics is studied. Probably the most famous concept of this sort is social 
capital, introduced into political science by the American political scientist 
Robert Putnam in his book Making Democracy Work (1993). On the basis of 
a comparative analysis of the functioning of regional institutions in Italy, 
Putnam demonstrates how social capital is the central determinant of the 
proper functioning of democratic political institutions. By social capital he 
means “the characteristics of social organization such as trust, norms and 
networks that may improve the efficiency of the society by facilitating coor-
dinated action” (167). From the definition it is obvious that social capital is 
made up of three dimensions. By norms Putnam means the norms of recip-
rocity among people, but not the norms of the specific, balanced reciprocity 
contingent to a simultaneous exchange of goods or services of approximately 
similar utility, but the norms of a generalized reciprocity which implies the 
continued relationships of cooperation and exchange that are at some point 
unbalanced but which include mutual expectations that what we are giving 
today will be returned in the future. The other component are the networks 
of civic ties; particularly important are the horizontal ties among the actors 
of equivalent status and power as opposed to the vertical ties that include the 
actors of unequal status and power, and which are negatively correlated to 
the development of social capital. When these two components – the norms 
of generalized reciprocity and the horizontal network of civic engagement – 
are diffused in the society, they create trust, the third dimension of social 
capital. 
 
1 On the travelling and stretching concepts in comparative politics cf. Sartori (1991).  
2 Thus Vladimir Vujčić argues that there are three basic dimensions and 26 subdimensions 
of political culture; some of these subdimensions – e.g. political participation – are internally 
very complex (Vujčić, 2001: 63-64).  
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 The definition also shows that social capital, with these three dimensions, 
is a much narrower concept than the concept of political culture. By nar-
rowing the conceptualization of cultural variables from political culture to 
social capital, Putnam responded to one of the major criticisms regarding the 
use of cultural variables in comparative research – that their use in various 
contexts causes the distortion of the original meaning – by reducing the 
number of defining characteristics, thus increasing the abstractness of the 
concept and its ability to “travel”. 
 Some researchers, however, did not stop at that, but further reduced the 
cultural variables used in research. Thus the concept of social trust was sin-
gled out, which is otherwise just one of the dimensions of the concepts of 
political culture and social capital.3 What is social trust and what distin-
guishes it from the other types of trust? 
 
Types of trust 
 Which are the dominant understandings of trust within social sciences? 
Earle and Cvetkovich say that trust represents “a simplifying strategy that 
enables individuals to adapt to complex social environment, and thereby 
benefit from increased opportunities” (1995: 38). Claus Offe claims that 
“trust is the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will contribute 
to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us” (1999: 
47). According to Sztompka “trust is bet about the future contingent actions 
of others” (1999: 2). Kenneth Newton by trust means “belief that others will 
not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look 
after our interests, it this is possible” (2004: 17).  
 It is obvious that trust is about the expectations of the behaviour of oth-
ers.4 Coexistence with other people invariably leads us to the situation that 
we have to cooperate with them and at the same time form the expectations 
about the behaviour of others. Bernard Barber claims that all social interac-
tion is in fact an endless process of shaping the expectations about the be-
haviour of others; they are partly cognitive, partly emotional, and partly 
moral (1983: 9). If we could completely control other people, trust would be 
unnecessary; however, in real life the instances of total control are extremely 
 
3 There are, of course, other cultural concepts used in political science research, but they 
will not be described in bigger detail in this paper, for example the concepts of civic literacy 
(Milner, 2002) and human development (Inglehart/ Welzel/Klingemann, 2003).  
4 It might be said that opposite trust there is trustworthiness, the characteristic possessed by 
certain actors or institutions, and means that these actors and institutions may be trusted. It 
should be pointed out that certain persons or institutions may possess this characteristic even in 
the situations in which the other side does not show trust. 
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rare. Insecurity and risk are an integral part of human existence, and one of 
the possible responses to these conditions is the emergence of trust.  
 Trust became an interesting topic for the contemporary social science in 
the mid-1950s, when the American sociologist Morris Rosenberg began us-
ing the concept of trust in people as a dimension by which he evaluated the 
level of misanthropy in a society (1956). Misanthropy is a phenomenon that, 
if pervasive, affects the functioning of democracy. For Rosenberg misan-
thropes are persons who mistrust others. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba 
in the already mentioned seminal book The Civic Culture (1963) also deal 
with trust and devote the entire tenth chapter to the issue of the quality of the 
relationships among people. Trust among people and the civic cooperation 
built on it for them is a very important dimension of civic political culture. 
Using Rosenberg’s expression of faith in people, they show how trust among 
people is the grounds for civic cooperation which, in turn, enhances the citi-
zens’ scope of influencing government. In the 1980s several major works 
were published about trust (Luhmann, 1979; Barber, 1983; Baier, 1986; 
Gambetta, 1988), but the real trigger for a sort of a boom of such works, 
both theoretical and empirical, was the classification of the category of trust 
as a major dimension of social capital.  
 In Making Democracy Work Putnam mentions trust as the most impor-
tant dimension of social capital (1993: 168), the one that facilitates citizens’ 
cooperation. For him, this is the horizontal trust among citizens, but he does 
not provide a more detailed explication of the concept of trust. He did that in 
another study, the book Bowling Alone (2000: 134-148), in which he ex-
haustively describes the type of trust he considers the central dimension of 
social capital. Putnam first says that social capital is about the social and not 
the political trust. In his opinion social trust is horizontal and refers to the 
trust among citizens of a political community, while political trust is vertical 
and refers to the trust of citizens in social and political institutions. 
 The second Putnam’s distinction is the one between the generalized and 
the particularized trust. Particularized trust stems from our personal relation-
ships with certain people i.e. “trust embedded in personal relations that are 
strong, frequent, and nested in wider networks is sometimes called thick 
trust” (137). Opposite to this is trusting the members of our own community 
we do not know, which Putnam calls the generalized or thin trust, an integral 
part of social capital. He uses the expressions social and generalized trust as 
synonyms, the practice later to be adopted by most other authors who dealt 
with the same subject. According to Putnam, this generalized trust enables 
us to extend the scope of trust beyond the circle of people we know person-
ally.  
 After the publication of Making Democracy Work some authors decided 
to additionally reduce the cultural variables and focus on the concept of so-
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cial trust. This resulted in an array of major works (Earle/Cvetkovich, 1995; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Misztal, 1996; Seligman, 1997; Offe, 1999; Sztompka, 
1999; Warren, 1999; Uslaner, 2002; Newton, 2004) about social trust that 
dealt with this concept thoroughly and systematically.  
 Apart from Putnam, all these authors consider it important to distinguish 
between different types of trust i.e. to highlight the difference between social 
trust and the other types. This differentiation derives from the fact that trust 
is a relational concept i.e. there must always be an object of trust (another 
person, a group of persons, or an institution).  
 Thus Claus Offe (1999) argues that a typology of trust may be arrived at 
by combining the difference between citizens and political elites on the one 
hand and the horizontal and vertical relationships on the other. By combin-
ing these two dimensions, Offe gets four possible types of trust – two hori-
zontal and two vertical. One type of horizontal trust refers to the trust of citi-
zens in their fellow citizens, and the other to the trust between different po-
litical elites.5 In vertical trust it is about the same relationship seen from two 
different perspectives: on the one hand is the trust of citizens in political el-
ites and political institutions filled by these political elites, and on the other 
the trust of political elites in citizens. Despite this classification Offe says 
that the term vertical trust is habitually used for the description of the rela-
tionship of citizens towards political elites and political institutions; hence 
this type of trust is often called political trust. Before the emergence of the 
concept of social trust, political trust was the most researched type of trust in 
political science research.  
 Within political trust it is possible to make further distinctions. Thus for 
example Pippa Norris (1999), using as her starting point the typology of the 
eminent political scientist David Easton, suggests there are five types i.e. 
five levels of political trust. These types are derived from the trust of citizens 
in various objects so that Norris talks about the trust in political community, 
a regime’s principles, a regime’s efficiency, a regime’s institutions and po-
litical actors. Very often authors (Hardin, 1993; Warren, 1999) point to the 
ambivalent relationship between trust and democracy since on the one hand 
democratic political system can hardly function efficiently without trust, 
while on the other the very idea of democracy implies the importance of 
showing distrust of political authority. Mark Warren argues that democracy 
stemmed from the politically formulated distrust of the traditional and eccle-
siastical authorities and that democratic evolution is built on the fact that 
 
5 Offe says that the trust among different political elites is not frequently enough a subject 
of scientific debates and research but that it is extremely important for the proper functioning of 
democratic political systems. Among other things, this trust means that people have confidence 
that power will not be abused i.e. that the democratic rules of the game will be respected and the 
power handed over if lost in elections.  
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citizens do not trust their political institutions (1999: 311). Margaret Levi 
says that “healthy skepticism of citizens is a prerequisite of democracy… 
Citizen’s expressions of skepticism and distrust may be the mayor engine for 
an even more democratic state” (1998: 96). It is obvious that for these au-
thors the importance of distrust for the proper functioning of democracy 
primarily lies in political trust i.e. political distrust. 
 At the level of horizontal trust, trust among citizens, several different 
types are also distinguished. Most authors identify as the most important the 
difference between the particularized and the generalized trust. Particular-
ized trust is the trust in the people we know (some authors /Newton, 2004/ 
also call it specific trust). Claus Offe (1999) labels this type of trust experi-
ence-based trust and says it is built around a continued interaction with con-
crete persons through a certain period. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) 
also claim that this type of trust depends on information and experience i.e. 
knowledge, hence they call it knowledge-based trust. Eric Uslaner calls this 
type of trust strategic as it represents a rational reaction to reliable behaviour 
of other people.6 
 The problem with this type of trust – experience-based, specific, and par-
ticularized – is its narrow scope because we know a relatively small number 
of people. In contemporary societies, the need for cooperation with strangers 
leads to the situations in which our experience-based trust is not sufficient. 
This type of trust represents a less amount of risk but also has a narrower 
scope i.e. the possibilities for achieving our interests. If we relied solely on 
this type of trust, we would miss on many opportunities for cooperation. 
Also, it must be added that the assessment of the reliability of other people, 
on which particularized trust is based, is inherently past-oriented i.e. based 
on the assessment of knowledge, abilities, and motives of others on the basis 
of past events and is consequently less oriented towards the future and the 
future possibilities of exercising trust. 
 A subtype of particularized trust is often the subject of research of the 
champions of rational-choice theories. This is the type of trust springing 
from interests and rational calculation. This approach was often used by 
Russell Hardin (1993) who, early on, argued that from the perspective of ra-
tional choice trust is in fact a paradoxal phenomenon since by displaying 
trust – which invariably includes a certain dose of risk – individuals agree to 
increase their vulnerability in relation to other people, which is not a form of 
rational behaviour. He wants to show how for individuals trust can never-
 
6 Niklas Luhmann (1988) lists the most important conditions fostering particularized trust: 
permanence of social relationships, reciprocal dependence i.e. the situation in which both actors 
know they depend on each other but they do not know the concrete situations in which they are 
going to be forced to cooperate, and the relative unpredictability of future events or the situa-
tions in which the actors do not know when they will be in a more or less auspicious situation.  
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theless be rational despite the apparent paradoxicality. Hardin’s starting 
point is the concept of interest and he claims how “one’s trust turns on not 
one’s own interes but on the interests of the trusted. It is encapsulated in 
one’s judgement of those interests” (505). In this approach those who dis-
play their trust do not assess the knowledge, abilities or competences of the 
people they come into contact with, but their interests.  
 Due to the limitations of specific trust, most authors, just like Putnam, ar-
gue that for contemporary societies the other type of horizontal trust is more 
important: generalized or social trust. Generalized trust is not about the rela-
tionships among concrete individuals in a certain concrete context, but con-
cerns the trust in other people in general. This is the trust in the members of 
our political community we do not personally know, people who are sort of 
strangers. Most authors use the terms social or generalized trust, but there 
are some other options. Uslaner claims that this type of trust can be called 
moralistic. According to Uslaner, moralistic trust is based on the conscious 
decision that people should be treated as trustworthy. The same term is used 
by Adam Seligman who says that moralistic trust is based on the belief in the 
existence of benevolence and good will by other people.  
 
Importance of social trust 
 Wherein lies the importance of social trust? In one of the first system 
analysis of the role of trust Niklas Luhmann claims that “without trust only 
very simple forms of human cooperation which can be transacted on the spot 
are possible. Trust is indispensable in order to increase a social system’s 
potential for action beyond these elementary forms” (1979: 88). And a little 
later: “possibilities of action increase proportionally to the increase of trust” 
(103). Bernard Barber says that “trust is an integrative mechanism that cre-
ates and maintains solidarity in social relationships and social systems” 
(1983: 21). Francis Fukuyama believes that “nation’s well being, as well as 
its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural charac-
teristic: the level of trust inherent in a society” (1995: 7). For Adam Selig-
man “any long-range attempt at constructing a social order and continuity of 
social frameworks of interaction must be predicted on the development of 
stable relations of mutual trust between social actors” (1997: 14).  
 Some authors (Misztal, 1996; Offe, 1999; Newton, 2004) claim that 
generalized trust is a contemporary phenomena linked to the processes of 
democratization that resulted in the acceptance of the freedom of choice as 
one of the fundamental human rights. In such circumstances, human activi-
ties are not based – as it used to be – on somebody’s social role and status 
but on the free choice of individual actors. This individual freedom of choice 
is enhanced by the fact that the contemporary society is characterized by the 
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existence of multiple and different options. In almost all spheres of life po-
tential options are enlarged and broadened. In exercising the freedom of 
choice and the choice of alternative possibilities, people very often rely on 
generalized trust.  
 Davorka Matić (2000), in a rare work on this subject by Croatian authors 
explicitly focuses on social trust and says that it is very easy to explain the 
importance of trust: “In an almost trivial sense carrying out of basic, every-
day activities is based on trust among the participants of those activities” 
(185). She goes on to explain it in more detail: “Trust is an integral part of 
our everyday life. Without a minimum of trust in other people and the roles 
they perform, our everyday life would be transformed into an unbearable and 
insupportable field of fear, uncertainty and ontological insecurity. Each time 
we order a meal in a restaurant, buy groceries, go for a walk, take a train or 
see a doctor, we do it on the assumption that there is no reason to fear for our 
personal safety or physical survival. Each new day is an adventure we em-
bark upon trusting that hundreds of other, familiar and unfamiliar people, 
will do us no harm, that they are going to behave reliably and predictably, in 
a word – properly” (184). It might be said that, unless we trusted that the 
people we meet in the street will not rob us, we would never leave our 
house. The alternative to this trust is generalized distrust that gives us a 
feeling of security but also impoverishes our existence.  
 Trust is what enables us to reduce complexity and to “take it for granted” 
most relationships in which we get involved daily. In contemporary complex 
societies people more than ever operate in the conditions of insecurity, so 
our reliance on generalized trust represents a strategy of coping with the 
complexity and insecurity of the environment in which we live and work.  
 Offe (1999) says that generalized trust is the basis of informal forms of 
social coordination without which it is difficult, and perhaps even impossible 
to resolve many problems of collective action facing contemporary societies. 
Even today, the state is an unavoidable factor in resolving the problems of 
collective action, but in many cases it is nevertheless too weak to be able to 
implement alone certain public policies. The development of societies to a 
large extent depends on the informal forms of social coordination that are 
based on citizens’ mutual trust and cooperation.  
 The meaning of social trust is studied by Piotr Sztompka (1999) who be-
lieves that contemporary societies have certain characteristics that make 
generalized trust particularly important. He mentions an array of such char-
acteristics among which he highlights the fact that the world we live in is in-
creasingly shaped by purposeful human efforts. Most societies are no longer 
based on faith but on human action i.e. the fact that we increasingly perceive 
and recognize our power as actors who by their purposeful activities may in-
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fluence future events.7 Generalized trust is, according to Sztompka, the re-
quirement for active involvement in the efforts to shape the future. 
 A significant number of authors point out that trust is especially impor-
tant as the basis for cooperation. It was Benn and Peters who in the 1970s 
highlighted this function of trust by saying that “the importance of trust de-
rives directly from the nature of human beings as social animals who can 
only satisfy most of their needs by means of coordinated and cooperative 
activities” (1977: 279). Dasgupta claims that trust is “lubricant of coopera-
tion” (1988: 49), while Barbalet claims that “trust is the emotional basis of 
cooperation” (1996: 75). Margaret Levi (1998) claims that trust is not the 
only possible grounds for cooperation but that it is cheaper than the complex 
systems of insurance that must be arranged with each new action. Where 
there is trust, these complex and very often expensive mechanisms of insur-
ance are unnecessary. She concludes that “cooperation is possible also with-
out trust, but collective action will be more efficient in the presence of trust” 
(1998: 14).  
 Individual relationships of trust aggregate at the level of the whole soci-
ety and create the culture of trust or distrust. When more actors cooperate, 
trust is a bet about each actor from whom we expect to do their part. As each 
actor has expectations concerning all the other actors, this network becomes 
increasingly complex, and above these individual expectations the general-
ized trust of individuals in entire groups is formed.  
 Sztompka (1999) argues that the dominant type of the relationships 
among the people in a community is manifested at the aggregate level in the 
form of the culture of trust or distrust. This culture of trust, if it exists, in-
cludes an array of positive effects on a community: it encourages sociability 
and associations with various people, improves communication and in that 
way enables to overcome the syndrome of insufficient information and igno-
rance which is one of the main obstacles in resolving the dilemma of collec-
tive action, breeds tolerance and acceptance of political differences as le-
gitimate, generates the ties of collective solidarity, even the readiness to sac-
rifice for the interests of others, and reduces transaction cost. The effects of 
the culture of distrust, according to Sztompka, are just the opposite: it fosters 
isolation, shuts down communication channels, promotes the development of 
defensive attitudes, and increases alienation and transaction cost. 
 
7 Luhmann similarly says that “the degree to which our own behaviour, in spite of social 
dependencies, is thought to have an impact on our future state, has varied considerably in the 
course of history” (1994: xii). According to Luhmann, presently we are living in an era in which 
the future increasingly depends on our decision-making i.e. there has been a shift from the soci-
ety based on faith to the society based on human action.  
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 A number of authors think that generalized trust is an extremely desirable 
characteristic of contemporary societies with a set of positive effects. Some 
works on social trust deal just with the testing of those theses at the empiri-
cal level. What does research tell us about the functions of social trust?  
 
Functions of social trust 
 Out of a plethora of research of the functions of social trust, in this paper 
we focus on several most important ones. In the already mentioned book 
Bowling Alone Putnam compares the American states and concludes that the 
higher levels of social trust are positively correlated with higher achieve-
ments on many areas such as the functioning of democratic political institu-
tions, economic development, educational achievements and health. His ba-
sic conclusion on the relationship between social trust and democracy is 
similar to the one he made about Italy: “The performance of our democratic 
institutions depends in measurable ways upon social capital” (349). For ex-
ample, he noticed an extremely strong correlation between higher levels of 
social trust and higher levels of readiness for political participation (292-
293).  
 The research using the same comparative framework of the American 
states was carried out by the American political scientist Stephen Knack. 
The results were published in his study Social Capital and the Quality of 
Government (2002). He suggests that his operationalization of the dependent 
variable – the functioning of government – is more technocratic than Put-
nam’s so he uses measures such as the quality of financial management, the 
level of capital investment, the levels of investing into human resources, the 
development of information technologies, and so on. Despite the different 
operationalization Knack’s results are very similar to Putnam’s: authority 
functions better in the countries with higher levels of social trust.  
 The issue of the impact of social trust on democracy was also dealt with 
by Pippa Norris (2001); she decided to test at the comparative level Put-
nam’s results for the USA. Using the data for 47 countries from different 
parts of the world collected in the third wave of the World Values Survey 
during 1995, she analyzed the influence of social trust on some dimensions 
of democratic political culture. The analysis of the levels of social trust 
showed that there are unmistakable differences between certain world re-
gions. The dependent variables which she used to analyze the influence of 
social trust on political culture were the readiness for political participation, 
social tolerance and interest in politics. She found out there is a positive cor-
relation between the higher levels of social trust on the one hand and social 
tolerance and interest in politics on the other. For political participation the 
correlation was determined only for the countries with the higher levels of 
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social trust; in the countries with the lower levels of social trust it does not 
exist. Norris also studies the relationship between social trust and the per-
formance of democratic institutions; she measured the performance of insti-
tutions by the index of the state of political rights and civil freedoms in indi-
vidual states which was designed by the international NGO Freedom House. 
The connection between these two variables is significant and relatively 
strong. Norris concludes that her analysis shows that social trust is linked to 
the development of democratic political culture, but also points out that the 
results of her research are agnostic due to the single direction of the causal 
relationship between those variables and that the answer to the question 
about the direction of this influence remains the task of future research.  
 Some researchers have focused on the research of the influence of social 
trust on economic prosperity i.e. the economic performance of groups, 
towns, regions and states. One of the most often quoted works from this area 
is the study by Francis Fukuyama Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation 
of Prosperity (1995) in which the author compares the economic perform-
ance of various states. Unlike neoclassical economists who think that human 
beings are basically rational and selfish beings whose main goal is to maxi-
mize their material affluence, Fukuyama claims that economic activity and 
economic success cannot be explained without culture. Fukuyama’s central 
thesis is that social trust is one of the main indicators of a state’s economic 
success. In his analysis he encompasses several states divided into two 
groups; the societies with high levels of trust e.g. Germany, Japan and USA, 
and the societies with low levels of trust e.g. France, China and Italy. The 
interesting thing is that Fukuyama does not use the usual measures of gener-
alized trust but the size of privately-owned enterprises; the large number of 
big privately-owned companies for him indicates high levels of generalized 
trust. Generalized trust enables the creation of spontaneous sociability that 
is, for Fukuyama, a precondition for concerted efforts in the achievement of 
common goals. The basic mechanism by means of which trust exerts such a 
positive effect on economic performance is by reducing transaction cost. Fu-
kuyama argued that when we can’t trust our employees or other market 
players, we end up squandering our wealth on surveillance equipment, com-
pliance structures, insurance, legal services, and enforcement of government 
regulations (181-182).  
 In his analyses Fukuyama does not go beyond the level of descriptive 
analysis. A concrete empirical test of the connection between social trust and 
economic prosperity was carried out by American political scientists 
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer in their work Does social capital have an 
economic payoff? (1997). They used the data collected within the World 
Value Survey conducted in 1981 and 1991. They compared the results for 21 
countries to give an answer to the question whether social trust affects eco-
nomic prosperity. They operationalized economic prosperity by means of the 
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increase of the level of income per capita and the growth of the level of in-
vestment, and their analysis shows that generalized trust has a beneficial in-
fluence on economic performance.  
 
Social trust in Croatia 
 Having in mind the above mentioned significance and functions of social 
trust it is logical to wonder about the levels of social trust in Croatia. A de-
tailed analysis of the state of social trust in Croatia requires a separate study; 
in this paper the levels of social trust in Croatia will be shown for three dif-
ferent points of reference, and they will be compared with the situation in 
some other European countries.  
 The question that detects the level of social trust is in fact very similar to 
the one asked by Morris Rosenberg in the 1950s in his already mentioned 
study of misanthropy. This question is asked almost in all research and is 
considered the classical measure of social trust. It runs as follows: Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? How to interpret the responses to this 
question? According to Putnam (2000) the answers indicate the levels of so-
cial, generalized trust i.e. the attitudes to the trustworthiness of others. 
Unlike particularized trust, this is not about the assessment of the trustwor-
thiness of the people we know, but about the general assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the people who live in our community. Though Putnam 
says that the answers provided are not completely unequivocal, nevertheless 
he thinks that they are the best possible indicator of the levels of social 
trust.8 Putnam suggests that the results should primarily be interpreted as a 
reflection of actual social experiences of the respondents. The responses to 
these questions as a matter of fact show us how people perceive the society 
in which they live and whether they consider the people who live in their 
community reliable. He thinks that it is logical to assume that the attitudes of 
the respondents reflect the actual social experience and not some psycho-
logical predisposition to believe or not believe. According to Putnam, when 
people say that most people can be trusted, they are not hallucinating but 
talking about something that reflects their own experience.9 
 
8 Putnam claims that the decreasing percentage of those who reply that most people can be 
trusted may be interpreted in two different ways: the first is that the respondents correctly con-
clude that trustworthiness today is much rarer than in the past, and the other is that the trust-
worthiness of others has not changed but that the respondents have become more paranoid.  
9 The response that most other people cannot be trusted i.e. distrust, also means a bet 
regarding the future behaviour of other people. In the case of expressing distrust this is a nega-
tive bet that implies negative expectations regarding the reliable behaviour of others. Such ex-
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 There is an interesting anecdote confirming his interpretation of the an-
swers to the question on trust, the study conducted by the magazine Reader’s 
Digest. This magazine sponsored a survey during which in 14 capitals of dif-
ferent European states 400 wallets were “lost”. Each wallet contained 50 
dollars and the name and address of ”the owner”. The percentage of returned 
wallets per state strongly correlates with the levels of social trust in those 
states, which brings Putnam to the conclusion that citizens accurately assess 
whether you can trust the majority of other people who live in their country. 
 The results shown in the table were obtained by means of secondary data 
analysis collected in the research whose primary subject was not social trust 
but which can nevertheless be useful for this paper. The paper will use sev-
eral sources of data i.e. databases.  
 Two of these databases are linked and have the common intellectual 
source. In the 1970s a group of social scientists from a few countries decided 
to launch a research project that would consist of a longitudinal comparative 
research of the fundamental values of inhabitants of European countries. 
Soon these researchers founded the European Values Systems Study Group 
based in the Netherlands and in 1981 they conducted, under the title the 
European Values Survey or EVS the first survey that included the represen-
tative samples of the populations of ten West-European countries.10 Another 
survey was carried out to see to what extent these values are subject to 
changes and whether there are any patterns of cultural changes applicable to 
most countries. This second survey was conducted in 1990 and encompassed 
about forty countries; among them were several states from Eastern Europe 
and a group of non-European countries; this second wave was labeled the 
World Values Survey or WVS. The organization of the research in the non-
European and the East-European countries was coordinated by the eminent 
political scientist Ronald Inglehart and his name is most often mentioned in 
connection with the World Values Survey. In order to get a better insight into 
the values of citizens of transitional countries and the Third World countries 
there was the third wave of surveys in 1995 that, apart from the above men-
tioned countries, encompassed a smaller number of established European 
democracies and in which the European Values Systems Study Group did not 
participate, the reason why this third wave of research is called the World 
 
pectations foster the creation of defensive mechanisms such as distancing, avoidance and isola-
tion which is, from the perspective of citizens’ capacity for joint action very negative.  
10 The coordinators of this research group were Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moor. The group 
included well-known social scientists such as Juan Linz and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. For 
more detail about this research project see http://evs.kub.nl. 
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Values Survey 1995-1997.11 The fourth wave of this research began in 1999 
and encompassed only European countries under the name the European 
Values Survey 1999-2000. This project is important because through four 
waves of research it enabled comparative data about chief attitudes, opinions 
and values of citizens of a number of – mostly – democratic countries. Thus 
a total of 64 states took part in at least one wave of this project.12  
 Croatia was included in two waves of this research, for the first time in 
the third wave, the World Values Survey 1995-1997 (the survey was con-
ducted in December 1995 on a sample of 1196 citizens). The research was 
coordinated by the Institute for the culture of democracy, and the coordinator 
was Vesna Pusić. The second research in Croatia was conducted during the 
fourth wave, the European Values Survey 1999-2000; the survey was con-
ducted by an interdisciplinary research team led by Josip Baloban from the 
Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Zagreb.  
 The third database that will be used in this paper contains the data gath-
ered during the first wave of the European Social Survey or ESS coordinated 
by the Center for Comparative Research from London.13 This research pro-
ject is financed by the European Commission to probe the attitudes, opin-
ions, beliefs and patterns of behaviour of citizens of European states, con-
ducted on national representative samples. So far two waves of research 
have been carried out, 2002/2003 and 2004/2005, and the preparations for 
the third are under way.14 The research encompassed 25 European states. 
Unfortunately, Croatia is not among them. Thus, in order to provide the third 
point of reference for the temporal comparative framework, the fourth data-
base was used.  
 This fourth database contains only the data for Croatia collected within 
the project of the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb under the title Elec-
tions, parties and parliament in Croatia 2000-2010. These are the data col-
lected during the field survey on a representative sample of 1153 Croatian 
adults in November of 2003. This research, Elections 2003, was conducted 
 
11 Detailed data on the first three waves of this research are published in World Values Sur-
veys and European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 (Inglehart et al., 
2000).  
12 Owing to the efforts of the European Values Study Group and the researchers from the 
University of Tillburg, the data for all four waves were combined into a single database and are 
available for the on-line analysis. The data are available on: http://www.jdsurvey.net/web/ 
evs1.htm.  
13 Detailed information on this project is published in the European Social Survey 
2002/2003: Technical Report (Jowell, 2003).  
14 The data collected in the first two waves of research are available for the on-line analysis 
on the following web page: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.  
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on the eve of the parliamentary elections and its primary objective was to 
collect the data for analyzing the electoral behaviour of Croatian citizens.15 
Nevertheless, as it contains the question on social trust, it may be also used 
in this paper.  
 The question on the condition of social trust can be found in all four 
databases. In all four surveys the same question was asked: ”Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?”16 The classical measure of social trust is 
the percentage of the respondents who choose the response that most people 
can be trusted.17 In Table the state of social trust in Croatia has been given a 
spatial and comparative temporal framework. 
 
 The results showed in the Table lead us to several conclusions. The first 
is that the use of the temporal dimension shows that the levels of social trust 
are relatively stable i.e. do not change quickly. Within eight years, the aver-
age level of social trust for all the states included in the analysis changed for 
only three percents. When the countries are analyzed separately, then in 
some cases the differences in the levels of social trust between two meas-
urement points are bigger than three percent. For example, the difference for 
Croatia and Italy is 11%, for Germany and Sweden 12%, and for Holland 
17%. However, certain differences between individual reference points are 
expected and should be further analyzed as to the possible causes of these 
changes. The total results show that the levels of social trust in European 
states are relatively stable. Secondly, the results show that between individ-
ual European countries there are significant and relatively enduring differ-
ences in the levels of social trust. Thirdly, there is a clear difference between 
the established democracies and the postcommunist countries. The results 
 
15 Detailed information on the main results of this research can be found in the book Izbori i 
konsolidacija demokracije u Hrvatskoj /Elections and consolidation of democracy in Croatia/ 
(Čular, 2005).  
16 Some authors (e.g.Baron/Field/Schuller, 2000) claim that it is not good to measure social 
trust by means of a single indicator and that instead several indicators should be used. Also, 
they think that the standard question about social trust is flawed, as it allows for only a di-
chotomic reply. With due respect to these criticisms, it should be pointed out here that this 
measurement is used in most research which makes it convenient for comparative analyses. This 
fact does not mean that there is no need for developing more sophisticated measures of social 
trust.  
17 Some authors (e.g. Norris, 2001) are not sure about how to treat the responses of “Do not 
know” i.e. that the respondents are not sure if they should trust others. This paper makes use of 
the interpretation according to which the uncertainty regarding whether other people may be 
trusted in fact signifies a lack of that trust, so all the analyses are based on the percentages of 
those who reply that most people can be trusted.  
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from the table show that the difference between the established democracies 
and the postcommunist countries exists for all three reference points and that 
the levels of social trust in the postcommunist countries are almost twice 
lower than the ones in the established democracies. When we combine the 
levels of social trust for these two groups of countries, then the difference for 
1995 is 21%, 14% for 1999, and 18% for 2003 (the average difference is 18%). 
 
Table: Social trust 1995-2003: Croatia in comparative perspective 
% of those who think that most people can be trusted  
1995 1999 2003 Average 
Austria - 31 31 31 
Belgium - 28 28 28 
Denmark - 64 67 66 
Finland 48 56 59 54 
France - 21 19 20 
Germany 32 36 23 30 
Greece - 21 15 18 
Iceland - 39 - 39 
Ireland - 35 39 37 
Italy - 32 21 27 
Luxembourg - 24 29 27 
Malta - 21 - 21 
Netherlands - 60 43 52 
Norway 65 - 62 64 
Portugal - 12 15 14 
Spain 29 36 27 31 
Sweden 57 64 52 58 
Switzerland 35 - 41 38 
United Kingdom 29 28 29 29 
Established democracies 43 35 35 38 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 27 - - 27 
Bulgaria 24 25 - 25 
Czech Republic  - 24 20 22 
Estonia 21 22 - 22 
Hungary - 22 16 19 
Latvia 24 17 - 21 
Lithuania 21 25 - 23 
Macedonia 8 - - 8 
Poland 17 18 12 16 
Romania - 10 - 10 
Russia 23 23 - 23 
Slovakia - 15 - 15 
Slovenia 15 21 18 18 
Postcommunist countries  22 21 17 20 
Croatia 23 20 9 17 
ALL COUNTRIES 29 29 32 30 
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 It is obvious that in the studies of social trust the category of postcommu-
nism is useful because the differences between the established democracies 
and the postcommunist countries have endured almost fifteen years after the 
transition began. Without the control of the other factors, it cannot be said 
that the communist legacy is the chief cause of these lower levels of social 
trust, but the correlations between these variables suggest that such an inter-
pretation cannot be dismissed but should be looked into by means of an ad-
ditional analysis. 
 Where is Croatia’s place in this comparative framework? The data from 
the Table show that in Croatia in the period between 1995 and 2003 there 
occurred a major erosion of social trust, particularly between 1999 and 2003. 
The measurements from 1995 and 1999 show that the level of social trust in 
Croatia was almost equal to the average in other postcommunist countries, 
but the data for 2003 show that that level was almost twice lower than the 
average in other postcommunist countries. Though there was an erosion of 
social trust in other postcommunist countries as well, the 11% erosion that 
occurred in Croatia – from 20 to 9 percent – is one of the biggest drops in 
the level of social trust between two reference points in all the countries in-
cluded in the table.18 With only 9 percent of those who think that most other 
people can be trusted, Croatia is a society with high levels of distrust.19 
 Unfortunately, the first systematic measuring of social trust in Croatia 
was conducted only in 1995 so that there are no data about what was hap-
pening in Croatia immediately after the collapse of communism. It may only 
be assumed that the level of social trust then was even higher than the 23% 
measured in 1995. This assumption is based on the fact that the collapse of 
the communist regime was followed by an eruption of nationalist sentiments 
and that most probably national solidarity reached its apex. The similar 
situation most probably existed in the sphere of political trust so that the new 
government, as it had replaced the old regime the citizens did not trust, en-
 
18 The data from the last measurement of social trust in Croatia should be taken with re-
serve. Namely, in the research carried out after early 1990s by researchers from the Faculty of 
Political Science, the question about social trust was asked for the first time (unlike many other 
questions from their other studies) only in 2003 so that the reliability of these results cannot be 
judged. Besides, Aleksandar Štulhofer in his paper (2004) also brings the data on social trust in 
Croatia, but again for 2003. His data are based on an international study South East European 
Social Survey. According to this study, 24 percent of Croatian citizens believe that most other 
people can be trusted. It is obvious that the difference between 24 and 9 percent is huge and that 
the future studies might look into which of these two studies – South East European Social Sur-
vey or Elections 2003 – better gauged the level of social trust in 2003.  
19 Piotr Sztompka (1999) argues that in the societies with eroded social trust there are 
tendencies suggesting that the members of those societies are increasingly shifting away from 
the discourse of human action to the discourse which stresses faith, providence, destiny and 
alike. An indicator of this tendency in Croatia is visible in the recent betting fever.  
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joyed trust regardless of its performance. With time the remembrance of 
these negative events from the communist period faded i.e. the old regime 
lost its power as a point of reference on the basis of which the new govern-
ment was assessed, and people began expecting some positive achievements. 
These positive achievements, due to a series of circumstances – primarily the 
aggression on Croatia and the misconceived policy of privatization – did not 
come easy. Added to this was the rise of unemployment and the growing so-




 Social trust is one of the most propulsive political science concepts of the 
last decade. A number of major research shows that it positively affects the 
democratic and economic performance in the established democratic coun-
tries but now also in the postcommunist societies. Unfortunately, that con-
cept so far has not been systematically used in political science research in 
Croatia.  
 By using the spatial and temporal comparative framework the paper 
shows that Croatia is a society with high levels of distrust. Such a situation 
may be an obstacle to the further political and economic development since 
social trust is the basis of cooperation among citizens i.e. the informal forms 
of coordination that are, as a number of studies show, a major condition of 
political and economic advancement.  
 It should be added that in this paper the analysis of social trust in Croatia 
was studied from a limited, preliminary perspective; one of the main goals of 
the paper was to usher this subject into Croatian political science. Since this 
is primarily a exploratory study whose purpose was to identify the elements 
that need to be dealt with in future studies in more detail, the results should 
not be seen as a definitive answer to the posed research questions but more 
as a set of instructions for future analyses. In that sense this paper is only the 
first step in the direction of the future and more detailed political science 
analyses of social trust in Croatia. Since this paper has used secondary data 
analysis, it would be important to design a study that will primarily analyze 
social trust.  
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